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NEVER ALONE: WHY THE INEVITABLE INFLUX OF DRONES
NECESSITATES A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
THAT ADEQUATELY PROTECTS REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
Paul Burgin *
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2011, North Dakota cattle rancher Rodney Brossart became
the first American to be arrested with the aid of a drone (Unmanned
Aircraft System(s) or UAS) operated by law enforcement.' Six cows
found their way onto Brossart's property, and he refused to turn them
over to law enforcement officials.2 Brossart and a few family
members chased police officers off of his property at gunpoint, and
police later returned with a warrant and SWAT team. A sixteen-
hour standoff ensued until police called in the assistance of a UAS to
pinpoint Brossart's exact location.' Shortly thereafter, SWAT
officers rushed in, tased, then arrested Brossart on various charges
including terrorizing a sheriff.'
A federal judge rejected a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that law enforcement officials did not have a warrant to conduct the
surveillance.6 On January 14, 2014, Brossart was sentenced to three
years in prison.'
• J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Political Science,
2013, Kenyon College. Many thanks to Professor Christopher J. Peters for his
tremendous insight and guidance throughout the writing process. The author
dedicates this Comment to his family for their unwavering love and support.
1. Joe Wolverton, II, J.D., First Man Arrested by Aid of Drone Convicted in North
Dakota, THE NEW AM. (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/const
itution/item/17534-first-man-arrested-by-aid-of-drone-convicted-in-north-dakota.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail, FORBES (Jan. 27,
2014, 7:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/predator-
drone-sends-north-dakota-man-to-j ail/.
7. Id.
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Law enforcement use of UAS for domestic surveillance has
sparked vigorous debate among the American public.8 Increased use
of UAS will greatly improve law enforcement's abilities to serve and
protect the American public.9 However, the promise of innovative
technology with substantial benefits does not come without its share
of detractors. Opponents of UAS surveillance express legitimate
concerns over potential abuse of this technology and erosion of
Americans' privacy interests. I0
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures."1 Courts have
consistently wrestled with how to properly analyze and apply this
18th century provision to constantly emerging and evolving 21st
century technologies. 2 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on
whether domestic UAS surveillance is a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment, and its current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does
not provide a clear answer.13 As with all new technologies, the
Supreme Court must strike a proper and unambiguous balance
between the legitimate interest of public safety and one's
constitutionally protected right to privacy. 14
This comment examines UAS developments and assesses whether
current legislation and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will
adequately protect individual privacies against government UAS
surveillance. Part II gives background on UAS technology and
capabilities, practical uses, differences from manned surveillance
systems, and current and proposed FAA regulations. Part II also
analyzes the Supreme Court's current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part III applies current Fourth Amendment case law
to a potential challenge to UAS surveillance and discusses how courts
8. RicHARD M. THOMPSON I1, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES 1 (2013).
9. J. Tyler Black, Note, Over Your Head, Under the Radar: An Examination of
Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to the Domestic
Police Drone Puzzle, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2013).
10. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 1.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 4.
13. Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police
Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 732 (2014).
14. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 861 (2004) ("It is generally agreed
that the general pragmatic goal of both constitutional and statutory law governing
search and seizure is to create a workable and sensible balance between law
enforcement needs and privacy interests.... A secondary goal is rule clarity.").
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should respond to ensure greater privacy protections against UAS
observations. Part IV suggests that privacy protections from
improper UAS surveillance may best come in the form of legislation.
Part IV also discusses potential legislative solutions that will protect
against constitutionally impermissible UAS surveillance.
II. HISTORY OF UAS TECHNOLOGY AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. UAS Technology and Capabilities
UAS are a class of aircrafts that vary in size, capability, are
operated through remote piloting, and do not require a human pilot in
the aircraft. 5 Some UAS models are the size of insects, while others
may be as large as a traditional jet.16 To date, the largest UAS is the
$200 million U.S. Air Force Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk
(Global Hawk). 7 This aircraft can reach 65,000 feet in altitude, has
the wingspan of an airliner, and can take part in non-stop, thirty-five
hour missions. 8 The Global Hawk can also film targets from a
distance of 140 kilometers (86.992 miles).19
In contrast, the Norwegian-developed Black Hornet, which weighs
sixteen grams, is one of the smallest UAS.20 The Black Hornet is
only ten centimeters long and can operate for twenty-five minutes in
a radius of more than one kilometer.' Small, less complex UAS can
be purchased online or in local stores for the price of a smart phone.22
However, one should not be misled by UAS that appear to be less
sophisticated, as many are capable of "autonomous flight, live video
streaming cameras, [and] GPS guidance. ' 23
15. Sara Love, Surveillance in the Free State: Electronic Communications, Location
Tracking, Automatic License Plate Readers, Drones and Facial Recognition, ACLU
MD. 11 (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.aclu-
md.org/uploaded-files/0000/0490/privacy-report.pdf.
16. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 2.
17. David Goldberg et al., Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems & Journalism:
Opportunities and Challenges of Drones in News Gathering, REUTERS INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF JOURNALISM 5 (June 2013), http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites
/default/files/Remotely /20Piloted%20Aircraft%20and%20Joumalism_0.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Mark Corcoran, Revealed: US Flew Spy Drone Missions from Australia,
ABC (Sept. 4, 2012), www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-03/revealed-us-flewdrone-
missions-from-australia/4236306).
20. Id. at7.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id.
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UAS can be supplied with sophisticated and innovative
technologies.2 4  For example, the U.S. Army has a 1.8 gigapixel
camera that can attach to UAS and "can track objects on the ground
65 miles away from an altitude of 20,000 feet. 21 5  Individuals can
equip UAS with infrared technology capable of using thermal
imaging in order to see through roofs, 26 and laser radar that can "see
through trees and foliage. ' 27 A U.S. Customs and Border Protection
UAS equipped with a thermal imaging camera aided law enforcement
officials in the arrest of Randy Brossart in North Dakota.28 The UAS
flew more than two miles above a farm to locate Brossart and two
others before their arrest.29  "[UAS] technology now allows an
individual to be recorded in their homes by drones as small as birds
and immediately uploaded to the internet. ' 30  This is in no way an
exhaustive list of UAS technology, and just scratches the surface of
their sophisticated, innovative capabilities.3'
B. UAS Can Be Useful in Military Missions, The Apprehension of
Domestic Terrorists, And Other Emergency Situations Such As
Detecting and Fighting Forest Fires
UAS may be most familiar to Americans for their pervasive
military use abroad.32 They are especially useful in a country with
rugged terrain such as Afghanistan, where they can perform
dangerous, behind-the-lines surveillance and pursue suspected
enemies. 3 UAS have been used to kill presumed members of Al
24. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 3.
25. Id. at3 n.21.
26. David Alan Coia, US Domestic Drone Use Sidesteps Warrants for Thermal Imaging,
NEWS MAX (Aug. 11, 2013, 7:51 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/US/drones-
warrants-thermal-imaging/2013/08/11/id/519767/. Thermal imaging was also the
subject of Kyllo v. United States, in which law enforcement officials suspected Kyllo
of growing marijuana in his home, and used thermal imagining devices to determine
the amount of heat emanating from the house. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
29-30 (2001). The Court ultimately ruled that this was an impermissible search under
the Fourth Amendment because a technology was used that was not in general public
use "to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion." Id. at 40.
27. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 4 n.24.
28. Coia, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Drones: Getting Smaller and More Intrusive, STRATEGIC CULTURE FOUND. (Apr. 4,
2014, 3:12 PM), http://www.strategic-culture.org/pview/2014/04/11/drones-getting-
smaller-and-more-intrusive.html.
31. See THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 3-4.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Black, supra note 9, at 1840.
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Qaeda and various other terrorist organizations.34 UAS are incredibly
desirable to the military due to their affordability and safety.35
Military UAS are operated from facilities in the United States, which
prevents military personnel from entering enemy territory in order to
carry out these missions.36
UAS are valuable tools that could assist in the apprehension of
domestic terrorists.37 For instance, UAS could have been an essential
asset to first responders in the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings.38 At various points throughout the emergency, law
enforcement officials were forced to ground a helicopter because it
needed to refuel. 39 The use of multiple UAS would have solved that
issue, and provided officials "with critical situational awareness in
areas too dangerous or difficult for manned aircraft to reach."40 UAS
are ideal for use during emergencies and disasters due to their quick
response time, economic feasibility, and ability to fly lower than
helicopters.4"
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) utilizes UAS to
guard the nation's border and prevent unlawful border crossings.42
Additionally, DHS uses UAS to detect and prevent the smuggling of
34. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 2.
35. Black, supra note 9, at 1840.
36. Id.
37. Jason Koebler, Industry: Drones Could Have Helped Boston Marathon Bombing
Responders, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (Apr. 16, 2013, 3:18 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/16/industry-drones-could-have-
helped-boston-marathon-bombing-responders.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. While law enforcement officials had to drive through a neighborhood looking for
one of the suspects in the bombing, many contend that a UAS could have found the
suspect quicker while simultaneously putting fewer individuals in danger. Maggie
Clark, Boston Bombings Show Future Use for Police Drones, HUFFINGTON POST (May
1, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/01/boston-bombing-
drones n_3192694.html.
41. Id.
42. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 3. UAS have helped prevent illegal border crossings by
criminals, aliens and terrorists. Id. DHS has ten drones flying to protect the borders,
at a cost of $62 million a year. Jeff Pegues, Homeland Security Drone Program Not
Justifying Expense, Says Study, CBS NEWS (Jan. 6, 2015, 7:21 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/homeland-security-drone-program-not-justifying-
expense-report-says/. UAS accounted for 2,220 border arrests in 2013. Id. At
roughly $27,000 per arrest, this has raised legitimate concerns about the expense and
effectiveness of the UAS program. Id. Customs and Border Protection disagrees with
the portrayal of the UAS program, as it led to the detection of nearly 8,000 suspected
illegal immigrants in 2014. Id.
2016
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drugs, weapons, and other illegal imports into the country.43 In 2014,
UAS missions aided in the seizure of nearly $253 million worth of
cocaine and marijuana."
Moreover, emerging UAS technology provides the capability to
detect and fight fires. 45  UAS can enter dangerous territories and
combat fires at all hours of the day in any weather conditions,
without risking lives.46 In August 2013, firefighters battling a giant
wildfire in Yosemite National Park were aided by a UAS. 47 The UAS
alerted officials to new developments in the wildfire that they
otherwise would not have immediately seen.48  While ground
commanders relied on helicopters that had to refuel every two hours,
the UAS was able to remain over the fire for 22 hours at a time
"allowing fire commanders to monitor fire activity, determine the
fire's direction of movement, the extent of containment and confirm
new fires ignited by lightning or flying embers."4 9 This ensured the
safety of firefighters and helped them better contain and eventually
extinguish the fire, which provided for the safety of the general
population. 0
C. UAS Are Starkly Different from Manned Aerial Surveillance
Systems
Many have inquired as to how UAS surveillance differs from
manned aerial surveillance systems and police helicopters that have
been in operation for quite some time.51 First, manned helicopters are
significantly more expensive than UAS, making their pervasive use
not economically feasible.52 A police helicopter costs between
43. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 3.
44. Pegues, supra note 42.
45. Jane Wells, Could the Next Wildfire Be Fought by a Drone?, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2014,
9:51 AM), http://www.cnbc.coni/id/102200957#.
46. Id. UAS can also deliver cargo and other materials to firefighters. Id.
47. Brian Skoloff & Tracie Cone, Firefighters Use Drones to Battle Yosemite Rim Fire,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Aug. 28, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/califomia-launches-drone-to-aid-wildfire-battle-
1.695666.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Jay Stanley, We Already Have Police Helicopters, So What's the Big Deal Over
Drones?, ACLU (Mar. 8, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-
and-liberty-criminal-law-reforn/we-already-have-police-helicopters-so-whats-big-
deal.
52. Id.
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$500,000 and $3 million,53 while some UAS can be purchased for
less than $100.14 Additionally, a police helicopter costs roughly $500
an hour to fly, while it is estimated that a UAS only costs $30 per
hour.5  Part of this can be attributed to the fact that manned
helicopters require gasoline, and UAS do not.56 Another factor is that
unlike UAS, a manned helicopter requires additional labor, such as a
pilot (or two) and routine maintenance that can be very expensive. 57
The economic burden helicopters place on police departments mean
that they are used very sparingly.5" In fact, many police departments
cannot afford helicopters and many have had to "abandon their air-
division because of the cost."59  However, the comparative
inexpensiveness of UAS surveillance may lead to more prevalent use,
which arouses serious privacy concerns, as "it could lift a practical
barrier to what has been a [legal] barrier to abuses. 6 °
UAS are also much more maneuverable than helicopters, which
poses increased privacy concerns.6' UAS are able to fly into a garage
53. Id.
54. Ann Zaniewski, As Drone Use Grows, So Do Privacy, Safety Concerns, USA TODAY
(Mar. 7, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/07/dro
ne-use-raises-privacy-safety-concerns/1969653/. When a gunman who had killed one
police officer and shot at many others "barricaded himself on the top floor of his
Mich[igan] home.... [a police deputy was sent] to a Brookstone store to buy a $300
Parrot A.R. Drone 2.0 App-Controlled Quadricopter." Id. Reluctant to send more
officers into the home and put their lives at risk, the County Sheriff hoped the UAS
would be able to see into the home in order to better evaluate the situation at hand. Id.
55. Gregory D. Lee, Police Drones are for Saving Lives and Money, Not for Spying on
You, FAM. SECURITY MATTERS (Dec. 24, 2011), http://www.familysecuritymatters.org
/publications/detail/police-drones-are-for-saving-lives-and-money-not-for-spying-on-
you.
56. See Stanley, supra note 51.
57. See Lee, supra note 55.
58. Stanley, supra note 51.
59. Lee, supra note 55.
60. Edward Humes, Eyes in the Sky, CAL. LAW. (Aug. 2013), http://www.callawyer.com/
Clstory.cfm?eid=930175&wteid=930175_Eyes in-theSky. "When the expense of
sending a human pilot on a mission is not worth it, a drone will do." Talai, supra note
13, at 748.
61. Stanley, supra note 51. A Rasmussen Reports telephone survey revealed that 65% of
likely U.S. voters oppose the use of UAS for domestic police work. 65% Oppose Use
of Drones for U.S. Police Work, RASMUSSEN REP. (Oct. 28,2013), http://www.rasmus
senreports.com/public-content/politics/general-politics/october_2013/65_oppose-use
of drones-for u s_police.work. Additionally, 35% in an Associated Press-
National Constitution Center poll said they were "extremely concerned" or "very
concerned" that police use of UAS for surveillance might cause them to lose privacy.
Joan Lowy, AP-NCC Poll: A Third of the Public Fears Police Use of Drones for
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or hover unseen outside of a bedroom window.62 Not even the
smallest manned helicopters possess these abilities.63 Not only can
UAS maneuver into smaller spaces than manned helicopters, they
also make little to no noise or appearance in the sky while doing so. 64
While the loud noises of helicopters may help one become aware of
potential surveillance, some UAS are silent, providing no such
notice.65 Understandably, the intrigue and demand for UAS has
increased among law enforcement agencies. 66
D. FAA Process in Evaluating Requests to Utilize UAS
Public entities that wish to fly UAS in the United States must
obtain a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the
FAA. 61 The FAA reviews the online requests and evaluates whether
the proposed use of the UAS can be accomplished safely.68 The COA
specifies a designed block of airspace in which the operator may use
the UAS and includes special requirements and protocols for the
proposed UAS use.69 COAs are issued for a specific period of time,
Surveillance Will Erode Their Privacy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2014), http://ap-
gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings-I 3.
62. Stanley, supra note 51.
63. Id.
64. Black, supra note 9, at 1840-4 1.
65. Stanley, supra note 51. In his dissent in Florida v. Riley, Justice Brennan, with great
trepidation, hypothesized a helicopter with capabilities strikingly similar to UAS. 488
U.S. 445, 462 (1989). "Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an
enclosed courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at all ....
Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what crops
people were growing in their greenhouses, but also what books they were reading and
who their dinner guests were." Id.
66. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FACT SHEET-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) (Feb.
15, 2015) [hereinafter FAA FACT SHEET], http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news_
story.cfm?newsid=18297. From November 1, 2012 to June 19, 2014, eight police
departments and eleven sheriff departments applied for authorization to acquire UAS.
Shawn Musgrave, Finally, Here's Every Organization Allowed to Fly Drones in the
US, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/every-
organization-flying-drones-in-the-us.
67. FAA FACT SHEET, supra note 66.
68. Id. Safety appears to be the prominent issue, as opposed to potential violations of
privacy. Id. "'Anyone who wants to fly an aircraft-manned or unmanned-in US
airspace needs some level of authorization from the FAA to ensure the safety of our
skies,' [said] Ian Gregor, a FAA spokesman for the Pacific Division .... " Cyrus
Farivar, Who's Getting FAA Approval to Fly Drones? A Kansas Town, Among Others,
ARs TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/1 0/whos-getting-faa-approval-to-fly-drones-a-kansas-town-among-
others/.
69. See FAA FACT SHEET, supra note 66.
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sometimes up to two years.70 From November 1, 2012 to June 19,
2014, 935 COAs were completed by military units, government
agencies, universities, and law enforcement agencies.7 Over 500 of
the applications are currently active, while the remainder are pending
review.7 2  However, a congressional mandate for widespread
integration of UAS into national airspace may render the current
COA process of case-by-case evaluation insufficient and obsolete. 73
E. FAA UAS Proposals
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
of 2012, which required the FAA to develop and implement a
strategy to safely integrate UAS into national airspace.74 Congress's
main focus in this legislation appears to be safety and not privacy.75
Section 332 of the Act, which details the integration process, does not
mention privacy a single time, yet refers to safety numerous times.76
The focus on safety and conspicuous absence of privacy is consistent
with the FAA's stated goals for the integration process.77 The Act
called upon the FAA to integrate UAS into national airspace by no
later than September 2015.7"
The FAA stated it wanted to announce new rules and regulations
for the commercial use of UAS before the end of 2014, but it failed to
do so. 79  On February 15, 2015, the FAA released its long-awaited
70. Id.
71. Musgrave, supra note 66. Universities and colleges consist of 25% of over two-
hundred government agencies that submitted COAs during this period. Id.
72. See id. From November 1, 2012 to June 19, 2014, only five COA applications were
disapproved, all of which were from academic institutions. Id. A large portion of
COA applications stem from the military, including National Guard units in nine
states. Id. During this period, eight police departments and eleven sheriff
departments submitted COA applications. Id.
73. Black, supra note 9, at 1844.
74. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126
Stat. 11, 73.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, FED. AVIATION ADM1N. (May 14,
2012), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsld=68004 ("The FAA's sole mission
and authority as it focuses on the integration of unmanned aircraft systems is safety.").
78. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73. "The plan ... shall provide for the safe integration of
civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system as soon as
practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015." Id.
79. Jeff Pegues, Some Drone Decisions Expected Soon, with Final Rules Likely Years
Away, CBS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/some-
drone-decisions-expected-soon-with-final-rules-likely-years-away/. The FAA's
2016 523
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UAS proposal.80 The proposal would allow UAS weighing up to
fifty-five pounds to fly within sight of their remote operators. 81 The
UAS also must stay below 500 feet in the air and fly less than 100
miles per hour. 2 Similar to the FAA Modernization Act of 2012, this
proposal targets the safety of UAS use, and does not address privacy
concerns.
83
The FAA requested sixty days of public comment on its proposal,
and "industry experts expect the analysis of comments could take 18
months or longer before the rules are completed." 84 It is apparent that
the FAA will not meet the September 2015 integration ordered by
Congress, with 2017 as a more realistic time frame.8 5
F. President Obama's Presidential Memorandum Governing UAS
Use by Federal Agencies
On the same day as the FAA's release of its UAS proposal,
President Obama issued a presidential memorandum, which has the
same legal effect as an executive order, requiring agencies to draft
and publish UAS policies within one year.86 The Memorandum
emphasizes that UAS should be used in a manner consistent with the
U.S. Constitution, federal law, and any other applicable policies and
regulations.87 Agencies may "only collect information 'to the extent
that such collection or use is consistent with and relevant to an
authorized purpose."' 88 The Order addresses privacy concerns and
dictates that any personally identifiable information (PH1) 89 collected
by UAS:
commercial ban on UAS remain in place, and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle
Systems International estimates that for every day UAS are not integrated into U.S.
airspace, the nation loses $27.6 million. Id.
80. Bart Jansen, FAA Unveils Drone Rules; Obama Orders Policy for Agencies, USA
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2015, 8:12 AM),
http://www.usatoday.con/story/news/2015/02/15/faa-drone-rule/23440469/.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. A Congressional transportation subcommittee chastised the FAA for its snail-like
pace in implementing these rules. Id.
86. Id.
87. Gregory S. McNeal, What You Need to Know About the Federal Government's Drone
Privacy Rules, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregor
ymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-heres-what-president-obama-thinks-
about-privacy/.
88. Id.
89. Personally identifiable information is information that can be used on its own or with
other information to identify, contact, or locate a single person, or to identify an
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shall not be retained for more than 180 days unless the
retention is determined to be: necessary to an authorized
mission of the retaining agency, maintained in a system of
records covered by the Privacy Act, or is required to be
retained for a longer period by any other applicable law or
regulation.90
The Memorandum requires agencies to ensure their policies in
regards to collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information
do not violate the First Amendment or discriminate illegally against
people based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity. 91  Agencies will be required to ensure that oversight
procedures for UAS use comply with existing policies and
regulations. 92
The Order also seeks to provide transparency in regards to agency
UAS activities, requiring them to provide notice to the public as to
where they are permitted to operate UAS in the national airspace. 93
In an effort to balance privacy interests with security and safety, an
agency is not compelled to release this information if the release is
reasonably expected to compromise law enforcement or national
security.94
To further ensure transparency, agencies will be required to inform
the public of their UAS programs and notify them of any alterations
that may significantly impact privacy rights.95 Agencies must also
publish an annual summary of their UAS operations, which will
include, in pertinent part, a brief and general description of missions
flown. 96
Although the agencies' policies are still forthcoming, UAS requests
and usage will only continue to increase, with law enforcement
individual in context. Guidance on the Protection of Personal Identifiable
Information, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/ppii.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2016).
90. McNeal, supra note 87.
91. Jansen, supra note 80.
92. McNeal, supra note 87.
93. Id.
94. Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 103, 3 (Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential
Memorandum].
95. McNeal, supra note 87.
96. Id.
2016
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agencies among the most interested parties.97  With increased
utilization by law enforcement agencies, it is inevitable that courts
will soon be charged with applying Fourth Amendment principles in
order to determine when a search by UAS has occurred. 98
G. An Overview of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures.99  Fourth
Amendment doctrinal analysis is one of frequent change, but its
intent has always been to shield individuals from overbearing and
excessive government intrusion in order to secure privacy interests. 100
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence continues to evolve with the
emergence of new technology in order to secure the privacy interests
of Americans." 1 As UAS use becomes more common, Fourth
Amendment case law will no doubt undergo another change, but we
must first examine jurisprudence most applicable to UAS use.
1. Modem Fourth Amendment Law Began with Olmstead v. United
States and the Law of Trespass
The Supreme Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States is
the beginning of the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.10 2 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that a wiretap
of the defendant's telephone was not a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment because the wiretap did not require a physical invasion
or trespass onto Olmstead's property.0 3 The Court opined that if
one's home, curtilage, person, papers, or tangible possessions were
not physically invaded, then a Fourth Amendment search did not
occur. 104
In a colorful dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the majority
opinion was ignorant to technical advances that could never have
been conceptualized when the Constitution was written. 105 Justice
Brandeis contended that when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,
"force and violence" were the only means by which the government
97. FAA FACT SHEET, supra note 66 (explaining UAS interest from various domestic
parties, and continuous growth in the issuance of UAS authorizations).
98. Black, supra note 9, at 1848.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 4.
101. Id.
102. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
103. Id. at 466.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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could invade property. 10 6 Therefore, Fourth Amendment protections
were limited to address only conceivable forms of "force and
violence.""1 7  Justice Brandeis argued that technological advances
have allowed the government to invade privacy in more subtle and
far-reaching ways, without constitutional protection. 1 8 He posited
that given these technological advances, the Supreme Court must
shift Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in order to protect individuals
from unjustifiable government intrusions on privacy, regardless of
the means employed.'09
2. The Shift from Property to Privacy Interests: Katz v. United
States (1967)
In Katz, the police used a bug in order to eavesdrop on the
defendant's telephone conversation from a public phone booth with
the door closed.110 The Court held that although the defendant was in
a public telephone booth and there was no physical trespass of a
"constitutionally protected area," bugging the telephone was
considered a search in violation of Mr. Katz's Fourth Amendment
rights."' The Supreme Court dramatically altered its conception of
the Fourth Amendment when it held that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people not places."' 112 Therefore it was not constitutionally
significant that the device the police used did not "penetrate the wall
of the [phone] booth.""' This shifted the emphasis of Fourth
Amendment inquiries from trespass law to privacy concerns. 114
The Court articulated that the inquiry in determining whether a
search violated the Fourth Amendment hinges on whether the
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy given the
circumstances." 5  One of the tests currently relied upon by courts
stems from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz. 1 6 Justice Harlan
established a two-prong test to determine whether or not a Fourth
106. Id. at 473.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 473-74.
109. Id. at 478-79.
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
111. Id. at350-51,359.
112. Id. at351.
113. Id. at 353.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 355-56. The Court held that because Katz had a reasonable and justifiable
expectation of privacy in the telephone booth, recording his conversations violated his
Fourth Amendment rights and was considered a search. Id. at 353.
116. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Amendment search had occurred.117 A court must consider whether
an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the area
where the search occurred and whether society recognizes that
expectation as reasonable." 8 While the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people not places,"' 9 Justice Harlan noted that
courts should consider the location of the alleged search in its
consideration of how much protection is required. 120 Courts will
likely hold an individual's expectation of privacy as more reasonable
if the events in question occurred in areas regarded as private, such as
the home. 2' Although the Court moved away from solely using
trespass law to determine whether a search under the Fourth
Amendment occurred, the location of the alleged search remained a
relevant factor in the Court's new test, which focused on an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 122
3. Fourth Amendment Protection of the Home Against Emerging
Technology and its Limitations
Historically, the home has been a focal point for American life, and
as a result, courts afford this area the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection.'23  The Supreme Court articulated that "the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house."' 124
This is rooted in the text of the Fourth Amendment, which states,
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their.., houses .. . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... -25
While it may be easy to detect physical entry into the home, the
Court soon had to grapple with advancing technology and its ability
to penetrate this fortress of solitude and privacy. In Kyllo v. United
States, the Supreme Court analyzed the government's use of a
thermal imaging device to examine heat patterns inside the home of
Danny Kyllo. 126  The Court held that the use of sense-enhancing
technology to infiltrate the home was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 2 7  In addressing the impact advancing
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 360-61.
123. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6.
124. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
127. Id. at 40.
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technology has on our conceptions of privacy, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, noted that "obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,' . . . constitutes a search-at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use." 12 8 Since the thermal imaging device used was not in
general public use, and the information gathered could only have
been obtained by entering the home, the Court ruled that there was a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.129
Fully aware of the privacy implications of advancing technology,
Justice Scalia wrote "[ilt would be foolish to contend that the degree
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology." 130 In Kyllo, the
Court attempted to increase privacy protections while also accounting
for technological advances that can penetrate the barriers of the
home. 3 ' While technology that improves observation and
surveillance beyond what one can see with the naked eye certainly
warrants scrutiny from courts, Kyllo does not give the home absolute
protection from government surveillance. 3 2 In his dissent, Justice
Stevens wrote that "searches and seizures of property in plain view
are presumptively reasonable. Whether that property is residential or
commercial, the basic principle is the same: 'What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."'133 This is consistent
with Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, in which he emphasized
that what a person exposes to the plain view of the public is not
protected because he or she showed no intent to keep the information
private.13 4  In order for this exception to come into force, law
enforcement officials must conduct the surveillance from a lawful
viewpoint, and the evidence they gather must be immediately
apparent. 135
128. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
129. Id. at 40.
130. Id. at 33-34.
131. Id. at40.
132. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)) (citation omitted).
134. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
135. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6.
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4. The Use of Manned Aircrafts to Conduct Surveillance of Areas
Open to Public View is Not a Search Prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment
In 1986, the Supreme Court heard two cases that began to define
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy from aerial
surveillance. 136
In California v. Ciraolo, the Court examined the constitutionality
of law enforcement officials' observations and photographs of a
fenced-in backyard made from a plane 1,000 feet above ground
level.37 Even though the respondent believed the fences he erected
gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court deemed this
expectation of privacy to be unreasonable.138 The Court held there
was no search because respondent had no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to his marijuana plants that could be observed
with the naked eye from 1,000 feet above ground. 139 There was no
reasonable expectation of privacy because "[a]ny member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed."' 14  The Court emphasized
the fact that the plane was in publicly navigable airspace, as defined
by federal statute. 141
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, also decided in 1986, Dow
Chemical Company refused to let the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) inspect their commercial plant. 142 The EPA then hired
an aerial photographer to take photos of the 2,000-acre commercial
plant "from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet with a very
sophisticated camera."' 143 The Court noted that while the camera was
sophisticated and precise, it was conventional and not so unique nor
penetrating into private realms so as to violate one's Fourth
Amendment rights.44
Additionally, the Court asserted that this was not a search and the
facility was not protected from police observation through an
industrial curtilage doctrine, similar to that of a private residence. 145
136. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986).
137. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
138. Id. at214-15.
139. Id. at215.
140. Id. at 213-14.
141. Id. at 213 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (Supp. 1982)).
142. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
143. Id. at 229, 238.
144. Id. at 238-39.
145. Id. at 234-35.
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Rather, an industrial complex is more analogous to an open field,
which is subject to observation by those in public airways. 146 The
Court again focused its analysis on the position of the aircraft and
noted that it was "lawfully in the public airspace immediately above"
the complex. 147  As such, Dow Chemical had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in its open-air facility, and thus no Fourth
Amendment search occurred.1 48
Three years later, in Florida v. Riley, law enforcement officials
received a tip that an individual was growing marijuana in a
greenhouse on his property. 149 Since officers could not see the inside
of the greenhouse from the ground, they flew a helicopter over the
property. 50 From an altitude of 400 feet, an officer was able to see
marijuana plants through cracks in the greenhouse roof.5' The Court
held, in a five to four vote, that there was no search, and the four-
justice plurality'5 2 again emphasized that the plane was in navigable
airspace where it had a legal right to be.' As a result, the public was
free to inspect the greenhouse from the same location as law
enforcement officials in the plane. 54 Therefore, the Court held that
no reasonable individual would have had a justifiable expectation of
privacy in the greenhouse because it was subject to both public and
official observation. 155
While Justice O'Connor agreed with the final judgment, her
reasoning differed from that of the plurality.'56 Justice O'Connor
deemphasized the fact that the officers in the plane complied with
FAA regulations, and instead focused her analysis more on the
reasonableness of the individual's expectation of privacy.'
O'Connor reasoned that the FAA's "purpose is to promote air safety,
not to protect [Fourth Amendment rights]."'58 O'Connor sided with
the plurality because she concluded that the defendant did not prove
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id. at 238-39.
148. Id. at 239.
149. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The plurality opinion consisted of Justices White, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy.
See id. at 447.
153. Id. at 449.
154. Id. at 449-50.
155. Id. at450-51.
156. Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 452-53.
158. Id. at 452.
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that public use of the airspace in question was so uncommon that he
had a justified expectation of privacy. 159
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Marshall,
held this to be a Fourth Amendment search and criticized the
plurality for abandoning the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard, set forth in Katz. 161 Justice Brennan argued that the
defendant's reasonable, justified expectation of privacy was violated,
yet the plurality disregarded the intrusiveness of the plane because its
positioning was legal according to the FAA.161 Justice Brennan
observed that part of the plurality's rationale that there was no search
hinged on the fact that "there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust,
or threat of injury." 162 He then asked the Court to:
Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at all..
. . Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to discover not
only what crops people were growing in their greenhouses, but also
what books they were reading and who their dinner guests were.163
Justice Brennan, with great unease, appears to have hypothesized a
device with very similar qualities to UAS.164 This passage illustrates
many of the legitimate privacy concerns our society faces with the
emergence of UAS, especially given the plurality's emphasis on the
legality of the location of the observing aircraft.165
5. Government Tracking and the Eventual Return to the Trespass
Test
The Supreme Court is divided over how to handle the resulting
privacy implications of "rapidly advancing surveillance
technologies."' 166 In general, "individuals have reduced-and in some
contexts no-Fourth Amendment protection from government
tracking of their travel in public places."' 67 In United States v.
Knotts, law enforcement officials placed a beeper inside a canister of
chloroform purchased by the defendant. 68 Law enforcement officials
then monitored the beeper in order to track the defendant's
159. Id. at 453.
160. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at461.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 462.
164. See id.
165. Black, supra note 9, at 1856.
166. Id. at 1862.
167. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 8.
168. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
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movements on public roadways. 169 The Court held that no Fourth
Amendment search occurred because people traveling on public
streets have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
movements. 170 The Court analogized the beeper surveillance to
police following the defendant in an unmarked car, which is legal and
would not constitute a search. 7' The Court stated that law
enforcement officials could have legally obtained the same
information from conventional surveillance measures, and the use of
a more efficient means of observation does not make it
unconstitutional.7 2  As a result, no Fourth Amendment search
occurred and no warrant was required for the observation. 73
While the government may monitor individuals' movements on
public roads, this warrantless tracking must cease once people enter a
private residence or any area where there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy.'74 In United States v. Karo, police placed a beeper in a
can of ether possessed by the defendant.'75 Law enforcement officers
tracked the beeper on public streets and while the beeper was in the
defendant's residence. 7 6 The Supreme Court held that this was a
Fourth Amendment search because it revealed details of the home, a
"location not open to visual surveillance."' 77 The Court distinguished
this from Knotts, because in this case the beeper revealed information
about the interior of the home, which law enforcement "could not
have otherwise obtained without a warrant."' 178
In United States v. Jones, the Court examined whether the
attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on an
individual's vehicle, and subsequent month-long tracking, constituted
a search. 79 The Court looked primarily to trespass law, rather than
the Katz standard in its conclusion that this constituted a search. 80
Justice Scalia explained that the Fourth Amendment protects people's
"persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
169. Id.
170. Id. at 281.
171. Id. at 282.
172. Id. at284.
173. Id. at285.
174. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
175. Id. at 708.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 714.
178. Id. at 715.
179. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-49 (2012).
180. Id. at 950.
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and seizures," and that an automobile is an "effect," deserving of
Fourth Amendment protection. 8'
Justice Scalia, who authored the four-justice plurality opinion,
acknowledged that while the Court did look mostly to trespass law to
conclude there was a search, this was not a substitute for the Katz test
of reasonable expectation of privacy.1 12 Rather, the trespass test was
to be added to the Katz test.'83 Justice Scalia articulated that there
was no need to undergo a Katz analysis because a search had already
been established by the officer's trespass upon an "effect" of the
defendant. 8 4 While Justice Scalia did not undergo a Katz inquiry, he
foreshadowed the need to potentially do so in similar matters absent a
trespass. "85
Justice Alito's concurrence cautioned that new technology has led
to methods in which the government can invade a person's privacy
that the Framers of the Constitution never fathomed. 8 6 As a result,
the protections of the Constitution must adapt along with
technology.'87 He opined that the use of long term GPS surveillance
of an individual impinges upon one's expectations of privacy,
because no individual suspects that law enforcement officials would,
or could, surreptitiously monitor and record their every movement for
an extensive period of time.'88 He wrote that in the past, "constant
monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks.., would have
required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial
assistance."' 189  However, GPS technology has made "long-term
monitoring relatively easy and cheap."' 9°
In a separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor opined that future
government conduct could certainly intrude upon privacy, "even in
the absence of a trespass."' 19 She criticized the majority's trespassory
test because it provides little guidance "[i]n cases of electronic or
other [emerging methods] of surveillance that do not [require] a
181. Id. at 949 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
182. Id. at 954.
183. Id. at 953.
184. Id. at 954.
185. Id. Justice Scalia wrote that "[w]e may have to grapple with. . . 'vexing problems' in
some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be
had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here."
Id.
186. Id. at 958-59 (Alito, J., concurring).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 958.
189. Id. at 963.
190. Id. at 964.
191. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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physical intrusion on property."'9 2  Justice Sotomayor possessed
concerns similar to Justice Alito in regard to tracking an individual
for an extended period of time.'93 She noted that tracking individuals
even for a short period of time "reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."'194
She asserted that while the government may obtain certain
information from GPS monitoring legally, its aggregation of this
information may violate reasonable expectations of privacy. 95
People may not reasonably expect their movements to be recorded
and compiled in a manner that allows the government to discover
intimate details such as sexual habits, political and religious beliefs,
etc. 196  Although not binding authority, these two concurrences
suggest that the length of time an individual is under surveillance
may be instructive on whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred.
Similar to Justice Scalia in Kyllo, Justice Alito's concurrence
warned that emerging technology consistently alters reasonable
expectations of privacy:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of
privacy expectations. But technology can change those
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to
periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.
New technology may provide increased convenience or
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does
not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology
192. Id. at 955.
193. Id.
194. Id. Justice Sotomayor elaborated that:
Disclosed in [GPS] data... will be trips the indisputably private
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on.
Id. (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
195. Id. at 956.
196. Id.
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entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable. 97
Justice Alito's and Justice Sotomayor's concerns with GPS
technology can be applied to UAS and the potential ramifications of
their widespread use by law enforcement officials.
III. APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO
UAS SURVEILLANCE
While the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case on law
enforcement's use of UAS, it could conceivably do so in the near
future. After the Jones opinion, it is undisputed that a UAS cannot
conduct surveillance by trespassing on an individual's private
property. 98 Under the doctrine, law enforcement officials would
have to land a UAS on a defendant's property or personal belongings
to commit a trespass.199 UAS have the ability to fly or hover over a
target without committing trespass.2 °° When UAS surveillance
occurs without any kind of a trespass, the surveillance would be
examined under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.20'
A. Existing Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Will Fail to
Adequately Protect the Home and its Curtilage From UAS
Surveillance.
In Ciraolo and Riley, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
government surveillance of the home and its curtilage using a
manned aircraft.2 °2 In both cases, the Court held the surveillance to
be constitutional because law enforcement officials were in navigable
airspace, where they, along with any other member of the public, had
a legal right to be.2°3 Since any member of the public could have
made the observations, any expectation of privacy was
unreasonable.2 °
In Riley, the valid surveillance occurred from 400 feet above
ground, which indicates that manned aerial surveillance is acceptable
197. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 964.
199. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 953 (majority opinion).
202. See supra Part II.G.4.
203. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213-14 (1986).
204. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
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from 400 feet and above. 05 The Court's rationale in using the
legality of an aircraft's altitude to determine a reasonable expectation
of privacy will not be tenable when examining UAS surveillance.
The FAA's proposal for governing UAS requires the aircrafts to stay
below 500 feet in the air, which means UAS would legally be able to
operate between zero and 500 feet. 0 6 If the Court follows the legally
navigable airspace precedent set forth in Ciraolo and Riley, then law
enforcement officials would be permitted to conduct UAS
surveillance of the curtilage of one's home from zero to 500 feet
above ground. Under this reasoning, since any member of the public
who uses a UAS could make observations from these altitudes,
individuals would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This
would effectively eliminate any privacy and Fourth Amendment
protections individuals possess in the curtilage of their homes. As a
result, in aerial surveillance cases, the Court should depart from the
credence it lends to the search occurring from publicly navigable
airspace.
Furthermore, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia acknowledged that
advancing technology has reduced the degree of privacy the Fourth
Amendment provides individuals.2 7 The Court held that there was a
search not because information was acquired that could not have
otherwise been obtained without physical entry into the home, but
rather, because the technology law enforcement officers used was not
in general public use. 08 The Court inferred that when the technology
used is available to the general public, no search occurs.2 09 Although
UAS have only recently come into general public use, their demand
among law enforcement agencies and other domestic parties is
continually increasing.21 0 The FAA estimates that up to 15,000 UAS
may be in the nation's skies by 2020.211
Evaluating reasonable expectation of privacy based on changing
public usage of a technology will be confusing for police and the
general public. While it is unclear how pervasive a technology must
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001). Justice Alito echoed this
sentiment in his concurring opinion in Jones. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
959 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
208. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
209. Id.
210. FAA FACT SHEET, supra note 66 (explaining UAS interest from various domestic
parties, and continuous growth in the issuance of UAS authorizations).
211. FED. AVIATION ADMiN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010-2030, at 48
(2010).
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be for it to be considered common, once UAS are considered in
public use, Kyllo dictates that the government, without a warrant,
may be able to use them to reveal information that otherwise could
not have been obtained without a physical intrusion into the home.2"2
Under this standard, there would be no justified expectation of
privacy from UAS surveillance of the home, eliminating all Fourth
Amendment protections from the area that has consistently been
afforded the greatest protection.213 As a result, the Supreme Court
must abandon the weight it places on the public prevalence of a
technology in determining reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. In Its Formulation of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, The
Court Should Base its Analysis on the Level of Intimacy of the
Details Revealed
In Katz, the Court expanded Fourth Amendment protections to
intangible interests such as privacy, but certain passages in the
opinion resulted in the loss of "protection for anything a person
exposes to the public or another person. 214 The majority opinion
noted that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. '215  This has instructed the Court's subsequent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and led to the view that once an individual
discloses a fact to the public in any way, the information is no longer
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections.216 Therefore, privacy and
Fourth Amendment protections depend on complete secrecy of
information.217
However, requiring secrecy in order to consider information private
and protected by the Fourth Amendment is inconsistent with Kat. 218
In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart wrote, "what [an individual]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."2 9 As a result, Professor Miriam
Baer asserts that the Supreme Court should shift its
conceptualizations of expectations of privacy to focus on the
212. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
213. See THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6.
214. RIcHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 6 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43
586.pdf.
215. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
216. THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 7.
217. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087, 1107 (2002).
218. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
219. Id.
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intimacy of the details surveillance reveals.220  In her Jones
concurrence, Justice Sotomayor candidly questioned the Court's
conception of privacy as secrecy, which renders any information
disclosed to the public or a third party unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. 21  She argued that it may be necessary for Fourth
Amendment case law to stop regarding "secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy. '221 She then expanded upon this in her declaration that she
"would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 223
While her opinion did not explicitly suggest a new Fourth
Amendment test, she laid the groundwork for a more practical notion
of Fourth Amendment privacy. 224 Justice Sotomayor conceptualizes
privacy not as secrecy, but rather as something that resembles
intimacy. 225 Her apprehension of GPS monitoring was its ability to
reveal, at a low cost, a "substantial quantum of intimate information
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion,
chooses to track. '226  GPS tracking, as well as other emerging
technologies, may reveal "a wealth of detail about [one's] familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."2 27
Additionally, in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,
he declared that "the right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems ... to be
the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy."228
While intimate may be difficult to define, it is a more workable
conception than privacy as secrecy because "it offers more stable
protection in a dynamic world. '229  An objective understanding of
what is and is not considered intimate is more stable than an objective
understanding of what is and is not secret due to consistently
220. Miriam H. Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and Workable Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes
Out the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L. J.F. 393, 402 (2014),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/secrecy-intimacy-and-workable-rules.
221. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Baer, supra note 220, at 396.
225. Id. at 402.
226. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 955.
228. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 599 U.S. 558 (2003).
229. Baer, supra note 220, at 403.
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evolving technology.23 ° It is incredibly difficult to ascertain whether
something is truly secret or not due to advanced technology. An
individual may wholeheartedly believe an activity to be secret, but
with advanced technological monitoring, how is one to know if that
activity is truly secret? Perhaps, unbeknownst to the individual, there
is another party somehow surreptitiously watching or listening. It is
almost impossible to know whether something is actually secret
because there is always the prospect that a person or technological
device not known to be present intercepts the activity or information.
However, while certain communities and societies may have
slightly different concepts of what is intimate and what is not,
generally speaking, certain information and activities will always be
presumed intimate. 31 Intimacy, even in the objective sense, unlike
secrecy, is not a rapidly shifting expectation and does not hinge on
the potential for unexpected intrusions or technological invasions. 232
Unless somehow disseminated to the general public, information
regarding an individual's sexual activities and sexual organs will
always be regarded as intimate. Furthermore, as articulated by
Justice Scalia, details inside the home will always be held as
intimate.233
As the law currently stands, "voluntary communication of
information enabled by technology leads to exploitation of citizens'
expectation of privacy that the Katz test should protect," but
subsequently fails.234 Emails, text messages, telephone conversations
transmitted digitally, and countless other intimate communications
will receive no Fourth Amendment protection because
230. Id.
231. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001) ("In the home, our cases show,
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes.").
232. See id.
233. Id. at 37; see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987) (articulating
that the scope of curtilage protected under the Fourth Amendment depends on whether
the location in question contains the intimate activity connected with the sacredness of
the home and life's privacies).
234. Lauren Elena Smith, Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of
United States v. Jones, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1003, 1017 (2013); see also United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would not
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection."); id. ("Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a
limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes." (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
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communications through network servers are not entirely secret. 235 It
is inconceivable for only secret information to have Fourth
Amendment protection, because privacy is much more than just
secrecy.236 If privacy is viewed as secrecy, then only a recluse or a
shut-in has true privacy.237 The concept of privacy is much more
significant than secrecy, as it is "the right to control knowledge about
our personal lives, the right to decide how much information gets
revealed to whom and for which purposes.1238 Intimate details shared
with friends and loved ones are no longer secret, but it is reasonable
for one to believe that they are still private, and the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy, not secrecy. 2
39
On the other hand, intimate and personal information made widely
available to the general public is no longer private.240 An intimate
email sent to a significant other is still private, even though it is
exposed to a network server and no longer secret. 241 However, if one
of the parties in this communication posts the email on a website, or a
billboard, then the communication is no longer private, despite the
fact that it contained intimate information.242
Brookings Institute fellow John Villasenor also indicates a potential
shift in the Fourth Amendment standard toward something
resembling privacy as intimacy.243 He wrote that, "the Court will not
grant the government the unconstrained power to perform warrantless
UAS surveillance. Instead, the Court is more likely to adopt a test
tied to the amount of detail revealed .... 244 This may refer to both
the specificity of the revelations and the quantity of evidence
gathered.245 The test envisioned by Villasenor points to intimacy as
the decisive factor in the legality of the surveillance.246 In doing so,
this test addresses Justice Sotomayor's concerns of the government's
ability to compile a large collection of evidence from extensive
235. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MoRE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 129-30 (2012).
236. Id. at 130.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 130-31.
240. Id. at 131.
241. See id. at 129, 131.
242. Seeid. at 131.
243. John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy,
36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457,516 (2013).
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
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surveillance (quantity), as well as her apprehension of short-term
surveillance that reveals a "wealth of detail" of private, intimate
matters (specificity).247
1. Evaluating Privacy as Intimacy Will Greatly Enhance Fourth
Amendment Protection of the Home
Conceptualizing privacy as intimacy will ensure that the home
continues to be the area that enjoys the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection where individuals can maintain high expectations of
privacy. Absent a trespass, privacy as intimacy will protect the inside
of the home from warrantless UAS surveillance. In Kyllo, Justice
Scalia articulated that "[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes." '248 This standard will continue the American
tradition of affording the home the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection and allow individuals to continue to have reasonable
expectations of privacy in their home.
One might question whether this is a workable principle. This
approach will prohibit law enforcement officials from performing
"unreasonable searches" of the home, but will not thwart their ability
to conduct warranted or reasonable searches. Law enforcement may
still search the home if, upon a showing of probable cause, they
obtain a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.
Another legitimate inquiry is whether this conflicts with the
Court's proclamation in Ciraolo that "[tihe Fourth
Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to
require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by
a home on public thoroughfares. '"24 9 If officers, absent a trespass,
witness illegal activity in the home that is in plain public view, this
standard would not demand the procurement of a warrant in order for
these observations to be admissible in court or to be considered
lawful surveillance. Rather, the Court may choose to shift its view on
what constitutes a search, and hold that examining part of the home
that is in plain public view is a search, but a reasonable one, and thus
not violative of the Fourth Amendment.250
247. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
248. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
249. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
250. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 104 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding
that an officer's observation, from a public vantage point, of drug activity in the
defendant's home was a reasonable, and thus lawful, search).
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2. The Supreme Court has Previously Examined Privacy as a Form of
Intimacy in its Analysis of Aerial Surveillance of Curtilage
The privacy as intimacy test is not solely limited to inside the
home. The Supreme Court has used an "intimate details" test in
previous aerial surveillance cases in order to determine whether or
not a search of curtilage occurred.25' In holding that no search
occurred in Dow Chemical Co., the Supreme Court distinguished the
covered buildings and offices on the complex, in which petitioner had
a reasonable expectation of privacy, from the remainder of the
complex.252 Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]he intimate activities
associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply
do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and
buildings of a manufacturing plant. 2 53 The Court also based part of
its holding on the fact that the photographs taken were "not so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.
2 54
In Ciraolo, decided on the same day as Dow Chemical, the Court
recognized that "ralerial observation of curtilage may become
invasive, either due to physical intrusiveness or through modem
technology which discloses to the senses those intimate associations,
objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow
citizens. 2 55 In its determination that no search occurred, the Court
held that no intimate details of this nature were revealed, and thus the
petitioner could not have had a justified expectation of privacy.256
The Court again looked to the intimacy of details revealed by the
surveillance in question in its decision in Riley. 257  The Court
concluded that the surveillance was not a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment because the plane was in publicly navigable airspace and
"no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage
were observed. '258  These holdings suggest that absent a trespass,
even from publicly navigable airspace, the surveillances would have
been deemed searches if they revealed intimate details associated
with the use of the home or curtilage. This provides curtilage with
251. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227 (1986); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207 (1986).
252. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
253. Id. at 236.
254. Id. at 238.
255. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14-
15, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (No. 84-1514)).
256. Id. at212-14.
257. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
258. Id. at 451-52.
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sufficient Fourth Amendment protection from the invasive
capabilities of UAS and other emerging technologies, while implying
privacy is not limited to what one keeps secret. The Court's penchant
for assessing whether or not a search revealed intimate details
indicates that a shift to use a test that conceptualizes privacy as
intimacy would be reasonable and not an outlandish departure from
current precedent.259
3. Privacy as Intimacy Outside of the Parameters of the Home and its
Curtilage
Outside of the home, it is much more difficult to determine what is
considered sufficiently intimate, and thus subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. Activities outside the home are less likely to
be considered intimate, but that is not to say that once one leaves the
home his or her actions should be devoid of all Fourth Amendment
protections.2 60  While a bright-line rule is more conceivable when
analyzing surveillance of the home, scrutiny of surveillance outside
the home is more likely to undergo multi-faceted tests or rest on
legislative standards.2 61
Professor Baer created a test she believes will sufficiently separate
"intrusions on intimacy," which will be considered searches, from
common public observations, which will not be considered
searches.262 The test derives from Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
in Jones, where Sotomayor expressed apprehension that GPS
tracking "generates a 'precise, comprehensive record' of the person's
public movements, which in turn convey intimate information such as
her 'familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.' 2 63  As a result, Professor Baer suggests that the
constitutionality of surveillance should be analyzed based on:
1. how comprehensively it generates information regarding
an individual who is the target of such investigative activity
and;
2. the degree of precision with which it has generated that
information regarding a single target or group of targets;
[and]
259. Id. at 452.
260. Baer, supra note 220, at 403.
261. Id. at 407; see discussion infra Part IV for legislative recommendations for UAS
searches.
262. Baer, supra note 220, at 404.
263. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
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3. the extent to which the activity in question proceeds
surreptitiously and is regulated by a coordinate branch and
therefore more or less prone to abuse.2 6
The first prong analyzing the comprehensiveness of the information
speaks to Justice Sotomayor's concern with the government's ability
to use extended surveillance in order to amass a large, thorough
collection of evidence, that when aggregated, can reveal many
intimate privacies. 61 The second prong, analyzing the precision with
which the information is collected, addresses Justice Sotomayor's
trepidation that even short-term surveillance may reveal a "wealth of
detail" of private, intimate matters. 266  While precise, short-term
surveillance may certainly reveal intimacies violating expectations of
privacy, Justice Sotomayor expressed more concern over the
extensive, long-term surveillance capabilities of GPS tracking
(capabilities also possessed by UAS). 267  Although short-term
surveillance can reveal individual, discreet, intimate actions, it is less
likely to invade upon "a person's 'zone' of intimacy" than constant,
twenty-four hours a day surveillance for weeks at a time.268
The third prong originates from Justice Sotomayor's suggestion
that a "coordinate branch" should potentially be charged with
oversight of police surveillance.2 69  This leaves open the realistic
option "that such supervision might stem from legislative, rather than
judicial, action. ' 270 This could be evidence of the Court's desire to
punt responsibility of making guidelines to another branch, most
likely the legislature.27'
264. Baer, supra note 220, at 404.
265. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Baer, supra note 220, at 406.
269. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would also consider the
appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a
coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth
Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent 'a too
permeating police surveillance."' (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595
(1948)).
270. Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 339 (2012).
271. Id.
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The third prong of this analysis also analyzes the extent to which
the surveillance was performed surreptitiously. 272 Justice Sotomayor
articulated that GPS monitoring is inexpensive and proceeds
surreptitiously (as will UAS), which enables it to "evade[] the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices:
'limited police resources and community hostility.' 2 73 This will help
prevent exceedingly clandestine surveillance that impinges upon
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy.
In United States v. Jones, Justices Sotomayor and Alito opined in
their concurrences that the long-term surveillance impinged upon
reasonable expectations of privacy and even absent a trespass,
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.274 The GPS tracking in
Jones lasted twenty-eight days.275 In the plurality opinion, Justice
Scalia neglected to mention whether reasonable expectations of
privacy had been violated and whether there would have been a
search absent the trespass.276
Let's assume arguendo that a majority of the Court would have
found that absent a trespass, the constant, twenty-eight day GPS
monitoring was a search because it violated the defendant's
reasonable expectations of privacy. One may then reasonably assume
that this Court would also hold constant, twenty-eight day UAS
surveillance violates justified expectations of privacy and is a search,
even absent a trespass. However, I do not believe that a majority
would hold that constant, GPS surveillance for four days would
violate reasonable expectations of privacy. Justice Alito stated,
"[u]nder this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy
that our society has recognized as reasonable. '"277 The Court would
likely hold that four day GPS surveillance of one's public movements
would not be a search because a person does not have a reasonable
expectation in his or her public movements from one place to
another.278 Under current jurisprudence, absent a change in Fourth
Amendment standards, the Court would probably come to the same
272. Baer, supra note 220, at 404.
273. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotornayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
274. Id. at 954-57; id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 946 (majority opinion).
276. Id. at 954.
277. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
278. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.").
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holding if the observations were done by a UAS and not a GPS.279
The Court would likely reason that the search was not the kind of
long-term search Justices Sotomayor and Alito cautioned against in
their concurrences in Jones, and that as dictated in Knotts, individuals
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their public
movements.28 o
However, the Court's current conception of privacy as secrecy does
not adequately account for the potential invasions of privacy posed
by new technologies such as UAS. Even absent a trespass,
permitting constant four-day UAS surveillance is far more intrusive
than four days of GPS tracking. While a GPS tracker only identifies
the movement and location of its target, UAS can capture images,
video, and sound recordings of its target.2"' This makes UAS
surveillance significantly more intrusive than GPS tracking, and the
Court must amend its notions of privacy to prevent erosion of the
concept altogether.282
In this example, the privacy as intimacy concept will better protect
against the invasive UAS surveillance than current Fourth
Amendment standards. Granted, the constitutionality of this
surveillance under the privacy as intimacy test will hinge on the
degree and amount of intimate information collected, but a four-day
constant surveillance that provides pictures, video, and sound
recordings will likely reveal a large degree of intimate information.
If one were to analyze this surveillance under Professor Baer's
privacy as intimacy test, one would first look at the
comprehensiveness of the information about the target that is
revealed. 283  "Comprehensive" can be defined as "rclomplete;
including all or nearly all elements or aspects of something" or "roif
large content or scope; wide-ranging. '28 4 A constant four-day UAS
observation will be quite comprehensive because it will encompass
almost everything the individual has done throughout the course of
the surveillance. 285  The information generated will be far more
comprehensive than GPS tracking because it will not be limited to
279. Id.
280. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957-64 (Alito, J.,
concurring); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
281. Villasenor, supra note 243, at 496.
282. See id.
283. Baer, supra note 220, at 404.
284. Comprehensive, OxFoRD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/defini
tion/american-english/comprehensive (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
285. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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where the individual is and at what time.286 The data will not be
constrained to merely one aspect of the individual's life.287  For
example, a grand jury subpoena served on a bank for months' worth
of historical bank records does not extend to all aspects of the
individual's life and "provide[s] far less comprehensive information
than around-the-clock surveillance. ' 288  Still images, video, and
sound recordings from UAS will provide complete insight into nearly
all elements of an individual's life for the four-day period. Naturally,
as the duration of the UAS observation increases, the information
obtained will be more comprehensive because there will be more
information compiled and aggregated. Nonetheless, while constant
four-day GPS surveillance may not generate information
comprehensive enough to be deemed a search, the all-inclusive nature
of a four-day UAS observation will produce sufficiently
comprehensive information that violates reasonable expectations of
privacy and will weigh toward an impermissible search.
The second prong in Professor Baer's test is to analyze "the degree
of precision with which rthe observation] has generated that
information regarding a single target or group of targets. 289 Precise
can be defined as "rmlarked by exactness and accuracy of expression
or detail. ' 290  GPS surveillance is only precise in the fact that it
reveals an individual's location and the exact time he or she was
there. 9' However, UAS are even more precise in this regard because
they can pinpoint exact locations with greater accuracy. 292 While a
GPS may relay an address, a UAS can use pictures and videos to
show exactly where the target went, and how they entered the
location.293 A UAS can show if the target entered a location through
the front door, back door, garage, or if they entered suspiciously
through a window, etc. UAS can also reveal if the target surveyed
286. See Villasenor, supra note 243, at 496 ("While . .. UAS surveillance is like GPS
tracking in that it gathers information using technology ... in one respect it is very
different: A GPS tracker only identifies the movement of the single vehicle or other
object to which it is attached ....").
287. Id. at 494 ("With present-day imaging capabilities, it would be an easy matter to use a
UAS ... within navigable airspace to acquire imagery that includes 'intimate details.'
For example, a government UAS at an altitude of several hundred feet could identify
the topic of an electronic or paper news article being read by a person sitting ... .
288. Baer, supra note 220, at 406.
289. Id. at 404 (emphasis omitted).
290. Precise, Ox FoRD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/am
erican-english/precise (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
291. See Villasenor, supra note 243, at 496.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 494.
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the premises before entering, if he immediately walked in, or if he
knocked in order to gain entry, and how he knocked. 94
For example, if an individual travels to an outdoor shopping mall, a
GPS may not be able to reveal the actual stores the individual visited.
However, a UAS would allow law enforcement to know exactly what
stores the person frequented, and in what order. A UAS may be able
to capture still images or video of the purchases the individual made
in each store, and could also potentially capture sound recording of
the individual discussing why he purchased those items.
The maneuverability and surreptitious nature of UAS allows for the
possibility to gather video and sound recording of in-person
conversations and telephone conversations, some of which may
reveal very private information.295 Some UAS can also read text
messages, which displays intrusive exactness and finite details far
beyond the capabilities of GPS.296
Furthermore, UAS are precise enough to reveal the clothing an
individual wears, how he walks, his facial expressions, mannerisms,
what he eats and drinks, and much more.297 The exactness of UAS
surveillance can aid law enforcement in discerning and compiling
incredibly specific, private information about an individual that other
technologies such as GPS would not be able to reveal. The precision
of these observations is far greater than those gathered from GPS and
can further expose "a wealth of detail about [one's] familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations," much of which may
reveal private, personal information.298
Of course whether the second prong of the analysis will weigh
toward a search or non-search depends on the precision and detail of
data gathered, and some observations may reveal more exact
information than others. Nevertheless, a constant four-day UAS
surveillance of a target that captures pictures, video, and sound
recordings will presumably gather highly precise information and
personal details of one's life that should weigh toward an invasion of
294. Did the individual knock hesitantly? Did they knock aggressively? Did they seem to
knock in some sort of code? These inquiries and observations may arouse suspicion
in law enforcement officials, and are examples of very precise information that UAS
can gather but GPS cannot.
295. See Erin Van der Bellen, Spy Drone Hacks WiFi Networks, Listens to Calls, WUSA9
(Dec. 12, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/2014/12/1 i/spy-
drone-hacking-cell-phones-text-messages/20214047/.
296. Id.
297. See THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 3-4.
298. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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reasonable expectations of privacy and lend credence to the notion
that a search occurred.
The final step in the proposed analysis is to examine "the extent to
which the activity in question proceeds surreptitiously and is
regulated by a coordinated branch and therefore more or less prone to
abuse." '299 Currently there is little oversight and regulation for UAS
surveillance. Some states have UAS policies that provide oversight
for state and local agencies, but this does not prevent federal agencies
from conducting UAS observations in these areas.300 There is no
congressional legislation that serves as a check on UAS surveillance,
with President Obama's presidential memorandum serving as the
only potential regulation that can prevent abuse.30 1 However, in these
early stages, the Order only requires agencies to draft and publish
UAS policies within one year.3 0 2  In the meantime, until agencies
compose their policies, oversight is limited and potentials for abuse
are widespread.
While agencies will be required to provide notice to the public as to
where they are permitted to operate UAS, °3 this broad measure does
not change the fact that UAS are surreptitious by nature, and will not
prevent the strong possibility of abusive observations. In an
investigation such as the one proposed, an agency would likely not
release this information because it would assert that disclosure would
"compromise law enforcement. '30 4
Until agencies compose their UAS policies, oversight is negligible
at best. Even once agencies compose and publish their UAS policies,
this will merely be self-regulation by the Executive branch. While
this is a passable initial step towards regulation, it is in no way the
final solution. Self-regulation within the executive branch is not
"regulat[ion] by a coordinate branch" and represents an insufficient
amount of oversight necessary to quell the enormous risk for abuse. 05
Until Congress enacts legislation and precludes the Executive branch
from self-regulating their UAS operations, there will be a tremendous
risk for abuse and insufficient oversight. The current UAS
regulations indicate that the third prong of this analysis undoubtedly
299. Baer, supra note 220, at 404 (emphasis omitted).
300. See David L. Hudson Jr., How Should States Regulate Drones and Aerial
Surveillance?, A.B.A J. (Feb. 1, 2015, 6:24 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazi
ne/article/howshouldstates regulate-drones and-aerial_surveillance/.
301. See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 94.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. See Baer, supra note 220, at 404 (emphasis omitted).
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will weigh toward a search.3 °6  Accordingly, under a privacy-as-
intimacy test, a constant four-day UAS surveillance would likely be
considered a Fourth Amendment search.
The privacy-as-intimacy test will definitely generate questions and
criticism, as terms such as "comprehensiveness" and "precision" are
left open to interpretation.307 However, this test will certainly be
more suitable than the current privacy as secrecy concept the Court
seems to have reached under Katz.308 Privacy as intimacy will uphold
the long-standing history of the home as the bastion of American life
and the area of the greatest Fourth Amendment protections. This test
will also allow individuals to maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the intimate workings of their daily lives, halting the
potential erosion of Fourth Amendment protections once UAS and
other emerging technologies are prevalently used to surveil.
IV. LEGISLATION MAY BEST ADDRESS PRIVACY
CONCERNS ELICITED BY UAS
While the privacy as intimacy test is the most suitable standard of
analysis for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as Justice Sotomayor
implied, it is entirely possible that oversight of surveillance may
instead come from legislative guidelines.30 9 Statutory guidelines may
help create a reasonable expectation of privacy based on what
governments deem to be legal or illegal in regards to UAS
surveillance. Justice Alito's concurrence in Jones also suggested that
the Legislature may be best suited to protect privacy interests in the
face of extensive technological change.31 0  He wrote that "[a]
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to
draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way."3"'
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 405.
309. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
311. Id.
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A. Warrant Requirements for UAS Surveillance Will Impose
Greater Restrictions on Law Enforcement Officials Than Required
by the U.S. Constitution, and Will Not Serve as a Long-term
Solution to Privacy Concerns Due to Constantly Changing
Technology
While the case law on UAS use is incredibly scarce, many states
recognize the privacy threats it presents and are considering
regulation.312 More than twenty states have passed laws related to
UAS.31 3 In 2013, Virginia became the first state to institute UAS
legislation when it instituted a two-year moratorium on all UAS use
by law enforcement agencies.3 14 Therefore, even pursuant to a search
warrant, law enforcement officials may not use UAS for surveillance,
except in certain emergency situations (Amber alerts, search and
rescue missions, etc.). 315
In contrast, Idaho, the second state to enact UAS legislation,
requires warrants for their use by law enforcement.31 6 The legislation
stipulates that UAS surveillance may only be used without a warrant
in emergencies, "for safety, search and rescue or controlled substance
investigations. 31 7 This is not a blanket ban on government use of
UAS for surveillance.318 Instead, the statute requires the government
to show probable cause and obtain a warrant in order to conduct
surveillance with UAS. 3 1
9
Some criticize warrant requirements because they impede police
work and impose limitations stricter than the Fourth Amendment
demands.32° In September 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown
vetoed legislation that would require law enforcement to obtain a
warrant for UAS surveillance missions, except in certain emergency
situations.3 21 After clearing the California State Assembly with a 59-
312. Hudson, supra note 300.
313. Id.
314. 2013 Va. Acts ch. 755 (placing a moratorium on the use of unmanned aircraft
systems); Jason Koebler, Virginia Becomes First State to Pass Drone Regulations,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 5,2013,4:42 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/art
icles/2013/02/05/virginia-becomes-first-state-to-pass-drone-regulations-.
315. 2013 Va. Acts ch. 755.
316. IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (Supp. 2015); 2013 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (July 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/tran
sportation/2013-state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-legislation.aspx.
317. § 21-213(2)(a).
318. Hudson, supra note 300.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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5 vote, the California State Senate voted 25-8 in favor of the bill.322
However, Governor Brown vetoed the bill because he claimed it
"would put greater standards on law enforcement than those required
by the U.S. and state constitutions. '323  He said while there are
certainly circumstances in which a warrant would be necessary for
UAS surveillance, the bill would have impinged upon the rights of
law enforcement officials.324
According to Villasenor, while in theory a warrant requirement
may bolster privacy interests, it may be impractical and imprudent.
325
Villasenor details a scenario in which a warrant requirement would
mandate the suppression of significant criminal evidence:
Suppose that a brutal assault that takes place on a sidewalk is
captured on video by a government-operated UAS that happens to be
monitoring traffic on the adjacent street. Suppose further that the
video from the UAS turns out to be the only available evidence that
can identify the perpetrator. It would defy common sense if the
police or prosecutors were barred by new UAS privacy rules from
making use of this information.3 26
A blanket warrant requirement would treat information from UAS
differently than information gathered by manned aircrafts and police
officers in person.327 Current Fourth Amendment case law does not
require law enforcement officials to avert their eyes from wrongdoing
until they have a warrant, and it would be nonsensical to impose a
requirement of this kind on the collection of information by UAS.328
One must ask what public policy objectives are advanced by the
suppression of evidence of a crime documented by UAS, when
identical evidence would be admissible if gathered from a manned
aircraft or from a police officer on patrol.329
Additionally, imposing a warrant requirement for all UAS
surveillance would only be a short-term solution. Statutes of this
322. Mike Segar, California Governor Vetoes Bill Requiring Warrants for Police Drones,
RT (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:33 PM), http://rt.com/usa/191660-califomia-brown-drone-veto/.
323. See Hudson, supra note 300.
324. Segar, supra note 322.
325. See Villasenor, supra note 243, at 511.
326. Id.
327. Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislators, in
THE ROBOTS ARE COMING: THE PROJECT ON CIVILIAN ROBOTICS, at 23 (Brookings
Inst., 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/dron
es%20aerial%20surveillance%201egislators/Drones AerialSurveillance_McNealFl
NAL.pdf.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 24.
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kind would only apply to UAS surveillance, so inevitably, when a
new advanced technology emerges there would be a need for new
legislation. Furthermore, it is quite possible that a warrant
requirement for only UAS surveillance will prompt law enforcement
officials to conduct the same surveillance, but argue in court that
what they used was not a UAS due to some minimal difference or
alteration, thus excusing them from the warrant requirement. This
would not enhance privacy interests, and would simply congest the
court systems with trivial technological arguments, as law
enforcement will merely attempt to distinguish their search
technology from UAS.
B. Legislation That Limits the Retention of Data Gathered Through
UAS Observations Will Help Limit Pervasive Surveillance That
Violates Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Laws that address the retention of data the government gathers
through UAS will help prevent law enforcement officials from
abusing UAS surveillance and invading privacy rights.330 This would
help deal with the legitimate concern of pervasive surveillance that
allows the government to know what individuals are doing at any
point in time, as well as the government's ability to review footage
years after its collection.331 This problem is not unique to UAS and
exists with all video and imagery collection.3 2 Legislation that puts
limitations on collection and retention of information, in addition to
storage and access, will address privacy concerns with all
surveillance technologies and not be limited to UAS.333 Data should
be more difficult to access as time passes.334 After a decided period
of time following data collection, the data should only be accessible
with a showing of reasonable suspicion that it relates to an ongoing
investigation or contains evidence of a crime.335 After an additional
number of days, data should not be able to be accessed unless the
government has probable cause that the information is relevant to an
ongoing investigation or contains evidence of a crime.33 6 Finally,
after an additional period of time, all data should be automatically
330. Villasenor, supra note 243, at 512.
331. McNeal, supra note 327, at 18.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 19.
336. Id.
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deleted so the government does not amass a long-term archive of
information about individuals.337
As dictated by President Obama's Order, such legislation should
place an emphasis on limiting the data retention of personally
identifiable information.338 Personally identifiable information is
most intrusive and violative of privacy rights because it can be used
to identify, contact, or locate an individual.339 Personally identifiable
information can reveal private information about an individual and
does not consist of insignificant observations of little to no personal
importance.3 40 Therefore, it is crucial that data retention legislation
highlights limitations to the collecting and storing of personally
identifiable information.
This will ensure compliance with President Obama's memorandum
because collected and stored data will be relevant to the "authorized
purpose" of the UAS observations, and law enforcement officials will
not be able to intrusively gather and aggregate data irrelevant to its
approved objective.3 41 These legislative safeguards will make sure
that all data not connected to an ongoing investigation or evidence of
a crime is destroyed, which will prevent law enforcement officials
from unreasonably invading justified expectations of privacy.
C. Legislators Should Write Duration-Based Statutes That Limit the
Amount of Time a UAS May Be Deployed for Surveillance in
Order to Prevent Unreasonably Pervasive and Extensive
Observation
Long-term surveillance may be impossible or impractical with
other technologies, but UAS allows for the realistic possibility of
extended surveillance.342 While no Supreme Court case has explicitly
ruled on extended surveillance with UAS, long-term surveillance was
discussed in United States v. Jones.343 In his concurrence, Justice
Alito wrote that extended GPS surveillance of one's movements in
public is unconstitutional and that "the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
337. Id.
338. See McNeal, supra note 87.
339. NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T COM, SPECIAL PUB. 800-122, GUIDE TO
PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII)
2-1 (2010), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-1 22/sp 8 00 -122.pdf.
340. Id.
341. See McNeal, supra note 87.
342. See, e.g., Skoloff& Cone, supra note 47.
343. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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expectations of privacy."'3 4  Justice Sotomayor, in a separate
concurring opinion, had similar concerns about extended surveillance
of individuals.345
UAS surveillance is similar to GPS tracking in that it gathers data
that in the past was not feasible to collect because it would have
required "a large team of agents. 3 46 However, one major difference
between the technologies is that a GPS tracker only identifies the
movement and location of the object it is attached to, while UAS can
capture images and recordings of its target.347  This makes UAS
surveillance more intrusive than GPS tracking. 348
To address this concern, "[1]egislators should craft . . . duration
based legislation" applicable to all technologies, in order to limit
pervasive and extensive surveillance of individuals. 349  This will
prevent law enforcement officials from using UAS or any other
technologies to follow individuals and oversee their daily actions and
travels.350 This will also speak to the trepidation individuals possess
that UAS or other surveillance technologies will hover directly above
their domiciles for extended periods of time in order to gather a large
aggregation of evidence about their home life and day-to-day
activities. 31 Durational limitations on surveillance should be decided
based on whether the jurisdiction wants to place a stronger value on
privacy or public safety.352
Gregory McNeal, a professor at Pepperdine University School of
Law, suggests that one plausible formulation of durational limitations
would permit continued surveillance of an individual for up to sixty
minutes at an officer's discretion. 353 Any surveillance that lasts from
sixty minutes to forty-eight hours would require reasonable suspicion
and a court order, while a warrant and probable cause would be
required for surveillance of longer than forty-eight hours. 354
According to McNeal, clearly delineated durational limits on
surveillance "creates public policy that is clearer and easier to follow,
344. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
345. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
346. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
347. Villasenor, supra note 243, at 496.
348. Id.
349. McNeal, supra note 327, at 17.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
556 Vol. 45
Never Alone
easier for courts to adjudicate, and doesn't allow for loopholes based
on technology. 3 55
Although duration-based limitations such as this are unambiguous
and transparent, they may not pose that significant of a hurdle to
intrusive law enforcement surveillance efforts. This proposed plan
allows for up to sixty minutes of surveillance at an officer's
discretion, but does not specify how long the UAS or surveillance
device must be grounded for before it may resume observations.
Under this proposed legislation, the government may observe an
individual for sixty minutes, land the surveillance technology for a
paltry amount of time, and then send the technology back in the air to
resume surveillance for another sixty minutes.356  This would
inconvenience law enforcement officials in their surveillance efforts,
but it would not substantially protect against pervasive and extensive
surveillance. As a result, under each elicited durational limitation,
legislation must contain a minimum amount of time in which the
surveillance technology must be grounded before it resumes
observations with a renewed time clock. This will better protect
against pervasive, continued surveillance, and serve as more than a
mere inconvenience to law enforcement in their intrusive
observations.
D. Statutes That Require Law Enforcement to Publicize Detailed
Surveillance Records Will Protect Against Abusive and Intrusive
Searches
Villasenor also argues for regulations that mandate law
enforcement officials "to keep thorough records identifying the
details of flight operations, including the date and time, location, who
was operating the aircraft, and what sort of data was collected. 357
Not only should these records be kept, but they should also be
published for public review in order to prevent abusive surveillance.
However, as President Obama specified in his memorandum, a
proper balance should be made between privacy and security, so
disclosure of information should not be compelled if it may
compromise law enforcement investigations or national security.358 If
disclosure compromises an investigation or security, then the
information should be kept confidential until the close of the
355. Id. at 18.
356. Id. at 17.
357. Villasenor, supra note 243, at 512.
358. See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 94.
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investigation, or until revelation of the information no longer poses a
threat. This type of transparency will hold law enforcement officials
accountable and prevent abuse of UAS surveillance.35 9
Additionally, UAS should only be sent on specific missions, and
not sent to comb the city for criminal activity.3 60 This is consistent
with the specification in President Obama's Order that agencies may
"only collect information 'to the extent that such collection or use is
consistent with and relevant to an authorized purpose."'361 Tennessee
addresses this in its Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act.362
The statute provides that "[n]o data collected on an individual, home,
or areas other than the target that justified deployment may be used,
copied or disclosed for any purpose. Such data must be deleted as
soon as possible, and in no event later than twenty-four (24) hours
after collection. '363 The law also allows aggrieved parties to civilly
sue law enforcement agencies for violations. 364 These accountability
measures will hold agencies responsible for their actions and serve to
ultimately protect individuals from violations of their Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.
V. CONCLUSION
UAS will inevitably become more widespread in our national
airspace and will be utilized more frequently by law enforcement
agencies. UAS possess significant surveillance benefits for law
enforcement agencies, however many of these advantages may pose
substantial risks to Fourth Amendment privacy rights. It is almost
certain that in the near future courts will be called upon to assess the
constitutionality of observations performed by UAS. The Supreme
Court has yet to rule on whether domestic UAS surveillance is a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment, and its current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not provide a clear answer.365
It is unlikely that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will be
able to shield individuals from invasive UAS surveillance, even
within the sanctity of their own home. The emphasis the Court in
Kyllo placed on whether the technology was in general public use
will all but eliminate reasonable expectations of privacy from UAS
359. McNeal, supra note 327, at 19-20.
360. Black, supra note 9, at 1866.
361. McNeal, supra note 87.
362. Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (LEXIS
through 2015 Sess.).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Talai, supra note 13.
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surveillance as it becomes more prevalent.3 66 Furthermore, in aerial
observation cases, the Court must reevaluate the importance it places
on whether the surveillance occurred from legally navigable
airspace.3 67 The FAA's proposal for UAS use mandates the aircrafts
to stay below 500 feet in the air.368  Following current precedent
would allow for warrantless UAS surveillance from 0 to 500 feet
above ground, and eliminate any reasonable expectations of privacy
individuals possess in the curtilage of their homes.
It is evident that courts must rework their Fourth Amendment case
law in light of rapidly advancing technology to ensure privacy
protections, especially in the home and intimate details of one's life.
The Court must shift its expectation of privacy analysis away from an
emphasis on secrecy of information, and more toward the intimacy of
the information observed.369 This will protect the intimate activities
of individuals' daily lives and return the home to an area of supreme
Fourth Amendment protections. As Justice Scalia once articulated,
"[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."370
Legislatures may also be called upon to safeguard justified
expectations of privacy from UAS and other advanced technological
surveillance.37 A warrant requirement for UAS surveillance will
impose greater restrictions than mandated by the U.S. Constitution
and will not be a long-term solution for privacy concerns.37 2
Legislation that imposes durational limitations on surveillance,
restricts data retention, and requires law enforcement agencies to
publish detailed records of UAS use will help prevent impermissible
privacy invasions in observation.373
While UAS will provide immense benefits and assistance to law
enforcement officials, courts and legislatures must take active
measures to properly balance public safety and personal privacy to
prevent the erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.
366. See THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 6.
367. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-14 (1986).
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369. Baer, supra note 220, at 402.
370. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
371. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
372. Hudson, supra note 300.
373. Villasenor, supra note 243, at 512; McNeal, supra note 327, at 17-19.
2016
560 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45
